"No Artist has Ethical Sympathies": Oscar Wilde, Aesthetics, and Moral Evolution by Sumpter, Caroline
"No Artist has Ethical Sympathies": Oscar Wilde, Aesthetics, and
Moral Evolution
Sumpter, C. (2016). "No Artist has Ethical Sympathies": Oscar Wilde, Aesthetics, and Moral Evolution. Victorian
Literature and Culture, 44(3), 623-40. DOI: 10.1017/S1060150316000127
Published in:
Victorian Literature and Culture
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
© 2016 Cambridge University Press
This article has been published in a revised form in Victorian Literature and Culture http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1060150316000127 This
version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:15. Feb. 2017
 1 
“No Artist has Ethical Sympathies”: Oscar Wilde, Aesthetics, and Moral Evolution 
By Caroline Sumpter 
 
  “There is no mode of action, no form of emotion, that we do not share with the lower 
animals” (137). This evolutionary claim is not attributable to Darwin, but to Oscar Wilde, 
who allows Gilbert to voice this bold assertion in “The True Function of Criticism”. While 
critics have long wrestled with the ethical stance and coherence of Wilde’s writings, they 
have overlooked a significant influence on his work: debates concerning the evolution of 
morality that animated the periodicals in which he was writing. Wilde was fascinated by the 
proposition that complex human behaviours, including moral and aesthetic responses, might 
be traced back to evolutionary impulses. Significantly, he also wrote for a readership already 
engaged with these controversies.  
Here, I argue that Wilde’s writings on morality, sympathy and aesthetics were shaped 
by those wider periodical debates over evolutionary science. Wilde’s protests against the 
assumed links between morality, nature and art in “The Decay of Lying” (1889) and “The 
True Function and Value of Criticism” (1890) – both published in the Nineteenth Century – 
create new meanings in the context of a periodical that also showcased Herbert Spencer and 
T. H. Huxley’s writings on evolution and ethics.1 Writing on Wilde’s “The Soul of Man 
under Socialism” (1891), first published in the Fortnightly Review, Josephine Guy is right to 
argue that its “relationship with contemporary periodical literature, and thus to what is local 
and topical, has been marginalized” (“‘Soul of Man’” 66-67), and her own work begins to 
redress this balance.2 Yet, as we will see, it is not just Wilde’s engagement with debates over 
socialism, but his wider writings on aesthetics, sympathy and morality that also deserve to be 
read in this “local and topical” context.  
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As editors of Wilde’s notebooks, Philip E. Smith and Michael S. Helfand have done 
meticulous and important work in tracing the sources of his early reading, including scientific 
influences. However, Wilde’s position was not static, and his participation in later journalistic 
evolutionary debates has led me to depart from some of their key assertions. These include 
the claim that Wilde’s critical position was fully established by the late 1870s, the assumption 
that Wilde adopted Spencer’s “conclusions” about society (29), and the assertion that Wilde 
took an “antimaterialist […] position in culture and politics” (14). Instead, I argue that the 
Nineteenth Century and Fortnightly Review reveal a more materialist Wilde, participating in 
debates over the biological origins of morality, and indebted to socialist understandings of 
moral impulses as feelings that evolve alongside changing economic relations. 
In examining Wilde’s engagement with evolutionary debates in the Nineteenth 
Century, I pursue a series of interlinked arguments. Firstly, I foreground connections between 
Huxley’s conception of the role of art in a non-moral universe and Wilde’s own aesthetic 
credo. Secondly, I consider Spencer’s attempts to link the evolution of art and sympathy, and 
explore the significance of his periodical writings on morality and altruism. Finally, I relate 
Wilde’s understanding of sympathy to his interest in tribal ethics, revealing his fusion of 
biological and socialist models of moral evolution. The Nineteenth Century can be seen as a 
forgotten link between Wilde’s interest in biological science and his writings on creativity 
and art – a link that offers fresh insights into his aesthetic position. Throughout, I reveal the 
evolutionary progressivism that underlies Wilde’s writings on ethics and art.   
 
‘Thrown into the bargain of life’:  Evolution and the Art Instinct  
Embarking on his critical essays, Wilde wrote with the speed of the jobbing journalist. 
By publishing his major pieces in the Nineteenth Century and the Fortnightly Review, liberal 
monthlies committed to open discussion of science, ethics and religion, Wilde was conscious 
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of entering a wider public debate.3 He clearly read and responded to other periodical 
contributions: as Guy has noted, Wilde incorporated references to recent Nineteenth Century 
debates on the Church into the proofs of the “Soul of Man”.4 Wilde was a professed admirer 
of both the Nineteenth Century and the Fortnightly: it seems unlikely that he would have 
overlooked Huxley’s prominent contributions to both, given his close engagement with 
Huxley’s writings in his university notebooks (Oxford Notebooks 49-55, 57-61, 214).  
Huxley’s appeal to Wilde is unsurprising: in an article published in the Nineteenth 
Century in 1900, Leslie Stephen cited Huxley’s claim that science and literature “are not two 
things, but two sides of one thing”, a phrase, he claimed, which “indicates the quality which 
makes Huxley’s writings as refreshing to the literary as to the scientific critic” (907). 
“Huxley’s best essays deserve to be put on a level with the finest examples of Swift or other 
great literary athletes”, Stephen asserted. Here, I suggest that Huxley’s contributions to the 
Nineteenth Century could indeed lay claim to being some of his best essays in Stephen’s 
terms, and that they also help to illuminate some of Wilde’s most celebrated critical pieces. 
An important essay is Huxley’s “The Struggle for Existence: A Programme”, which was 
published in the Nineteenth Century in February 1888, less than a year before “The Decay of 
Lying” appeared. If Huxley’s article explored the human implications of a non-moral nature, 
Wilde’s essay reveals intriguing parallels, and builds on Huxley’s brief reflections on the 
place of art and the artist’s role.5 
In his early unpublished article “[The Rise of] Historical Criticism” (1879), Wilde had 
presented a view of nature that appears ordered and harmonious: Aristotle, he suggested, was 
the first to point out “that nature, including the development of man is not full of incoherent 
episodes like a bad tragedy. That inconsistency and anomaly are as impossible in the moral as 
they are in the physical world” (Complete Works IV: 32). Ten years later, in the “Decay of 
Lying”, however, Vivian muses on the fact that nature is utterly “indifferent” to humanity: 
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“Whenever I am walking in the park here, I always feel I am no more to nature than the cattle 
that browse on the slope, or the burdock that blooms in the ditch. Nothing is clearer than that 
nature hates Mind” (36). The symmetry between nature and human morality can no longer be 
maintained. Indeed, in “The True Function”, humanity indeed seems to be trapped in a bad 
tragedy, where no justice or moral consistency can be assumed. “Life is terribly deficient in 
form”, Gilbert muses. “Its catastrophes happen in the wrong way, and to the wrong people” 
(437).  
In “The Struggle for Existence”, Huxley rehearsed arguments that would become 
better known through his celebrated Romanes Lecture “Evolution and Ethics” (1893). While 
from a purely intellectual perspective nature appears “the incarnation of a faultless logical 
process”, if our “moral sympathies” are engaged it is something very different:  indeed, “from 
the point of view of the moralist the animal world is on about the same level as a gladiator’s 
show” (“Struggle” 163). Huxley was, however, careful to argue for the special status of both 
art and society. Although society, like art, is part of nature, Huxley claimed that it is:      
Convenient to distinguish those parts of nature in which man plays the part of 
immediate cause, as some thing apart; and, therefore, society, like art, is usefully to be 
considered as distinct from nature. It is the more desirable, and even necessary, to 
make this distinction, since society differs from nature in having a definite moral 
object; whence it comes about that the course shaped by the ethical man – the member 
of society or citizen – necessarily runs counter to that which the non-ethical man – the 
primitive savage, or man as a mere member of the animal kingdom – tends to adopt. 
The latter fights out the struggle for existence to the bitter end, like any other animal; 
the former devotes his best energies to the object of setting limits to the struggle. 
(“Struggle” 165) 
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Ethical man should, Huxley asserted, strive to rise above his animal instincts – his “ape and 
tiger” promptings, as he later described them with a nod to Tennyson (Evolution and Ethics 
63). Despite its offence to human “moral sympathies”, Huxley was careful to assert in “The 
Struggle for Existence” that nature was non-moral, not immoral, and that the conception of an 
evil nature was as erroneous as the conviction of its benevolence. Significantly, it was to art 
which Huxley turned to counter a Schopenhaurian pessimism, for there was a “sufficiently 
obvious fact” which: 
renders the hypothesis that the course of sentient nature is dictated by malevolence 
quite untenable. A vast multitude of pleasures, and these among the purest and the 
best, are superfluities, bits of good which are to all appearances unnecessary as 
inducements to live, and are, so to speak, thrown into the bargain of life. To those 
who experience them, few delights can be more entrancing than such as are afforded 
by natural beauty, or by the arts, and especially by music; but they are products of, 
rather than factors in, evolution, and it is probable that they are known, in any 
considerable degree, to but a very small proportion of mankind. (164)  
For Huxley, human aesthetic sensibilities, a random by-product of evolution serving no 
function in the struggle for survival, are nevertheless wonderful “superfluities”, the pleasures 
of which might offer consolation for nature’s moral indifference. Huxley was sure that 
“artists are born, not made”: these developed aesthetic gifts were given only to the few 
(“Struggle” 173). Wilde’s reflection on the relationship between art and nature in “The Decay 
of Lying” becomes, in this context, more than a protest against realism; like Huxley, Vivian 
also suggests that aesthetic gifts afforded to a minority allow individuals to distinguish 
themselves from the rest of animal life, and provide them with compensation for nature’s lack 
of purpose. As he proclaims:     
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My own experience is that the more we study art, the less we care for nature. What art 
reveals to us is nature’s lack of design, her curious crudities, her extraordinary 
monotony, her absolutely unfinished condition [….] Art is our spirited protest, our 
gallant attempt to teach Nature her proper place. (35) 
In “The Decay of Lying”, it is aesthetic man, not Huxley’s ethical man, who becomes a 
symbol of human progress, distinguished from “the primitive savage, or man as a mere 
member of the animal kingdom”. While Vivian is sure that “All bad art comes from returning 
to life and nature, and elevating them into ideals” (55), the nature imagined, as George 
Levine has also noted, is a distinctly post-Darwinian one, whose driving mechanism has no 
regard for human values.6 
 In “The True Function”, Wilde argued that Darwin, along with Ernest Renan, made 
the nineteenth century “a turning point in history”: failure “to recognise this is to miss the 
meaning of one of the most important eras in the progress of the world” (459). Although 
Wilde is known to have owned On the Origin of Species and The Descent of Man, it is 
evolutionary arguments mediated via writers such as W. K. Clifford, Huxley and Spencer – 
figures who were also high-profile debaters in the Nineteenth Century – that are cited directly 
in his Oxford notebook and commonplace book, rather than Darwin himself.7 Nevertheless, 
Darwin performs a symbolic function in the essays: while in “The True Function” he is 
presented as the supreme example of “sweet reasonableness” and is credited with “the 
philosophic temper” (458), in “The Soul of Man” Darwin emerges as the consummate 
individual: one of the few who has managed “to keep himself out of reach of the clamorous 
claims of others […] and so to realise the perfection of what was in him […] to the 
incomparable and lasting gain of the whole world” (292).  
 The great artist or scientist, however, did not rise above nature completely: for 
Wilde’s understanding of the development of the mental and aesthetic faculties was shaped 
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by strong assumptions about biological inheritance. Wilde’s construction of Darwin as one of 
the rare men of exceptional talent who was born not made has echoes of Huxley’s own 
understanding of the inheritance of genius. In his book Hume (1878), read and excerpted by 
Wilde in his Oxford notebook, Huxley had justified scientific and artistic genius as a type of 
instinct:  
The child who is impelled to draw as soon as it can hold a pencil; the Mozart who 
breaks out into music as early […;] the boy Pascal who evolved Euclid out of his own 
consciousness […] may be said to have been impelled by instinct, as much as the 
beaver and the bee. And the man of genius is distinct in kind from the man of 
cleverness, by reason of the working within him of strong innate tendencies – which 
cultivation can improve, but which it can no more create, than horticulture can make 
thistles bear figs. (113)  
Wilde’s claim, that Darwin realised “the perfection that was in him”, suggests that he indeed 
developed these “strong innate tendencies”. Although, as Philip E. Smith and Michael S. 
Helfand have shown, Wilde was well-acquainted with Ruskin’s notion of racially inherited 
aesthetic capabilities (Oxford Notebooks 12), he also placed a significant emphasis on 
individual genius – on those who deviated from supposed racial norms  – as a driving force 
for artistic development.  In “The True Function”, Ernest suggests, “surely you would admit 
that the great poems of the early world, the primitive, anonymous, collective poems, were the 
result of the imagination of races, rather than of the imagination of individuals?” Gilbert 
replies, “Not when they became poetry. […] Indeed, I am inclined to think that each myth 
and legend that seems to us to spring out of the wonder, or terror, or fancy of tribe and nation, 
was in its origin the invention of one single mind” (135).  
The philologist Max Müller’s theorisation of the communal creation of myth (as the 
product of a creative linguistic impulse that arose amongst Indo-European ancestors) was 
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well known in the period. It was certainly known by Wilde, who was taught by Müller at 
Oxford.8 Gilbert, however, who takes the dominant role in the dialogue, links creativity to 
individual genius from humanity’s inception. These capacities are clearly distributed 
unequally amongst individuals, but the fact that they are evolutionary attributes is not 
questioned. In “The True Function”, Gilbert maintains:  
Temperament is the primary requisite for the critic – a temperament exquisitely 
susceptible to beauty […]. Under what conditions, and by what means, this 
temperament first appeared in the evolution of the race, we will not discuss at present. 
It is significant to note that it exists, and that there is in us a beauty-sense, separate 
from the other senses and above them, separate from the reason and of nobler import, 
separate from the soul and of equal value […]. But to be purified and made perfect, 
this sense requires some form of exquisite environment (450). 
Like Huxley, Gilbert suggests that while cultivation can perfect this innate tendency, it 
cannot implant it. Gilbert notes that at first “it is to exist purely as cultivated instinct” (450).  
 
Art and the Evolution of Sympathy  
Huxley and Wilde were not the only writers in the Nineteenth Century to discuss the 
evolution of complex human attributes assumed to be “impelled by instinct”. Wilde, as a 
number of critics have noted, revealed obvious debts to Herbert Spencer: notably in his 
understanding of biological and social evolution as a process of differentiation and 
specialisation, a movement from homogeneity to increasing heterogeneity.9 However, while 
Wilde’s Oxford notebooks contain quotations from Spencer’s First Principles and Principles 
of Sociology (28-29), the possible influence of Spencer’s later articles for the Nineteenth 
Century and their links to his works on evolutionary ethics and aesthetics have not been 
examined. In fact, despite Wilde’s early enthusiasm for Spencer, Vivian makes a somewhat 
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slighting reference to him in “The Decay of Lying”: life, he predicts will follow art, “tired of 
repeating herself for the benefit of Mr Herbert Spencer, scientific historians, and the 
compilers of statistics in general” (46). Wilde’s direct reference to Spencer creates a self-
conscious dialogue with this prominent Nineteenth-Century contributor: a dialogue about 
sympathy, morality and art that Wilde would continue in “The True Function” and “The Soul 
of Man”.  
In his articles “On Justice” and “On Justice Concluded” – published in the Nineteenth 
Century in March and April 1890, precisely when Wilde was working on “The True 
Function” – Spencer argued that the origins of morality lay with a social instinct in animals 
with survival benefits for the group – an argument that Darwin had previously advanced in 
the Descent of Man (100-27).10 Rather than Huxley’s “gladiators’ show”, Spencer argued that 
it was possible to see a primitive form of “animal ethics” in the natural world, including an 
instinctive sympathy and altruism. The “best” amongst animals were the most adapted, 
goodness indistinguishable from fitness to evolutionary circumstance (“Justice Concluded” 
610). For Spencer, human morality emerged gradually from the struggle for survival, not 
from conscious attempts to check that struggle.  
              In “Justice Concluded”, Spencer explicitly directed the periodical’s readers to the 
second edition of his own Principles of Psychology, where he had also discussed the 
evolution of sympathy and altruism (612).11 Those who followed Spencer’s lead would have 
discovered that the Principles of Psychology also devoted considerable attention to the 
evolution of the “aesthetic sentiments”, and argued that the same evolutionary and adaptive 
process was at work in the production and reception of art. Arguing for a progressive 
widening of the sympathetic powers as humans became more adapted to society, Spencer 
asserted that when: 
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A long discipline of social life, decreasingly predatory and increasingly peaceful, has 
allowed the sympathies and resulting altruistic sentiments to develop, these, too, begin 
to demand spheres of superfluous activity. Fine Art of all kinds takes forms more and 
more in harmony with these sentiments. Especially in the literature of imagination we 
may now see how much less appeal there is to the egoistic […] sentiments, and how 
much more to the altruistic sentiments – a trait likely to go on growing. (Principles of 
Psychology 714)  
“Aesthetic activities in general may be expected to play an increasing part in human life as 
evolution advances”, Spencer argued, and they “will in a greater degree than now appeal to 
the higher emotions” (714).12 Suggesting, like Huxley, that art is a by-product of evolution – 
a “play-impulse” (694) that exercises excess human energies, rather than a factor in the 
struggle for existence – it nevertheless appears to be a gauge of evolutionary progress. For 
Spencer, art was directly linked to sympathy: indeed, it could only be perfected when humans 
had become highly adapted to their environment, which would allow their sympathetic 
instincts to flourish.  
 Spencer was sure that a “large volume of emotion without painful intensity in any 
part, is the effect which a successful drama, or poem, or novel, produces”, a “variety such as 
leaves behind no satiety or exhaustion” (709). These emotions, although appealing to moral 
sentiments, were not a prompt to moral actions: “These are no longer links in the chain of 
states which prompt and guide conduct” (Principles of Psychology 713). When Gilbert in 
“The True Function” states that “emotion for the sake of emotion is the aim of art, and 
emotion for the sake of action is the aim of life, and of that practical organisation of life we 
call society”, he might be seen to echo a Spencerian understanding of an art whose emotional 
pleasures are divorced from direct moral consequences, as much as proclaiming discipleship 
of Pater and the philosophy of art for art’s sake (440; italics in original).13   
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However, if Wilde, like Spencer, emphasised the evolution of an aesthetic instinct that 
was not a direct prompt to moral action, he also revealed a clear point of departure from 
Spencer by arguing against art’s appeal to our sympathies. In “The Decay of Lying”, Vivian 
claims that as “long as a thing is useful or necessary to us […] or appeals strongly to our 
sympathies, or is a vital part of the environment in which we live, it is outside the proper 
sphere of art” (41). Spencer had offered an assessment of the history of art based on the 
evolution of sympathetic feeling: from the “inferior sentiments” that characterise Greek art, 
to works of modern art which reveal a still imperfect stage of social evolution, that are “low” 
in the “sensual and the sanguinary” emotions they “express and arouse” (Principles of 
Psychology 712). Wilde did something more radical: he sought to sever familiar links 
between aesthetic taste and sympathy, and in so doing to question affiliations between taste 
and a moral sense. These affiliations – familiar to Wilde from both Plato and an eighteenth-
century tradition of moral philosophy – had received a new endorsement by evolutionists 
such as Spencer and Huxley, but as the product of biological inheritance rather than a God-
given order.  
In his 1877 “Modern ‘Symposium’” article for the Nineteenth Century, Huxley had 
discriminated between social morality – based purely on utility, or “the increase of general 
happiness” to society – and personal morality. The former was relative: if murder, theft or 
adultery could be shown to have no negative effect on the general happiness, they could not 
be classed as immoralities in social terms. However, Huxley asserted that it did not follow 
“that they might not be personal immoralities”: 
I see no reason for doubting that the beauty of holiness and the ugliness of sin are, to a 
great many minds, no mere metaphors, but feelings as real and as intense as those 
with which the beauty or ugliness of form or colour fills the artistic mind, and that 
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they are as independent of intellectual beliefs, and even of education, as are all the 
true æsthetic powers and impulses. (537) 
Huxley made similar claims in his book Hume: that “morality is based on feeling, not on 
reason” and that “goodness is a kind of beauty” (Hume 207). It was possible, however, to be 
born without such feelings. As Huxley stated in the Nineteenth Century:  
I do not doubt the existence of persons […] devoid of any sense of moral beauty or 
ugliness, and for them personal morality has no existence. They may offend, but they 
cannot sin; they may be sorry for having stolen or murdered, because society punishes 
them for their social immoralities, but they are incapable of repentance. (“Modern 
‘Symposium’” 537)  
Huxley’s hereditary personal morality is a sense of “moral beauty”, an “internal taste” that is 
at the foundation of a moral sense.14 
In “Pen, Pencil and Poison: A Study”, published in the Fortnightly Review in January 
1889, Wilde wryly claimed that, despite committing multiple murders, Thomas Griffith 
Wainwright’s “love of art never deserted him”, concluding “there is no essential incongruity 
between crime and culture. We cannot re-write the whole of history for the purpose of 
gratifying our moral sense of what should be” (54). For Wilde, here at least, goodness was 
not a kind of beauty: a beauty sense should not assume a moral sense. Wilde would use The 
Picture of Dorian Gray, published in its earliest form in Lippincott’s Monthly Magazine the 
same month as “The True Function” appeared in the Nineteenth Century, to question whether 
heredity could be blamed for individuals whose highly developed aesthetic impulses were not 
matched by innate moral tendencies. Frequently discussed as both a homage to and a critique 
of Walter Pater, Dorian Gray, I would suggest, also involves a more subtle engagement with 
Spencer and Huxley’s assumptions about relationships between inherited ethical and aesthetic 
faculties.  
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Wandering through the ancestral portrait gallery at Selby Royal, Dorian wonders 
exactly what he has inherited: “had some poisonous germ crept from body to body till it had 
reached his own?” (Complete Works III: 288). While Dorian claims to be “poisoned” by a 
book (352), this scene contains its own wry reference to the book that is heavily hinted at: J. 
K. Huysmans’s A Rebours.15 Huysman’s narrator opens with a tour of his protagonist Des 
Esseintes’s ancestral portrait gallery, intimating that he is the last of a degenerate biological 
line. The similarity of these scenes – and the deterministic notion of heredity that they 
explore – makes the notion that a book can be “fatal”, changing biological destiny rather than 
appealing to innate proclivities, seem dubious. Dorian is devoid of personal morality in 
Huxley’s terms – the “ugliness of sin” provokes no revulsion in terms of taste and moral 
feeling: on the contrary, the suffering of others becomes a source of aesthetic pleasure. The 
narrator muses on the possibility of a biologically determined morality that shakes the very 
foundations of individual responsibility:   
There are moments, psychologists tell us, when the passion for sin, or for what the 
world calls sin, so dominates a nature, that every fibre of the body, as every cell of the 
brain, seems to be instinct with fearful impulses. Men and women at such moments 
lose the freedom of their will. They move to their terrible end as automatons move. 
(Complete Works III: 330) 
The narrative voice is famously slippery. It is materialist science (psychology) rather than the 
narrator himself that seems to endorse this moral determinism. Yet the notion of a brain and 
body “instinct with fearful impulses”, and an understanding of sin as “passion” points to 
moments, at least, when moral decisions are not decisions at all, but the workings of a 
biological destiny impelled by feelings and instincts.  
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 In his Nineteenth Century articles, Wilde showed a persistent fascination with the 
idea of morality as an evolutionary and adaptive instinct, founded on emotion rather than 
reason. In “The True Function”, Gilbert announces:  
The security of society lies in custom and unconscious instinct, and the basis of the 
stability of society, as a healthy organism, is the complete absence of any intelligence 
amongst its members […] one is tempted to define man as a rational animal who 
always loses his temper when he is called upon to act in accordance with the dictates 
of reason.  (446)   
Irony aside, Wilde’s language may show traces of his earlier reading of Spencer on the 
evolution of moral instinct: “what is morality but the perfect adjustment of the human 
organism to the actual conditions of Life, and to the observance of those inexorable Laws to 
break which is death”, Wilde wrote paraphrasing Spencer in his Oxford Notebooks (156).16 
Yet the Notebooks do not tell the full story: there are obvious reasons why Spencer and the 
claim that social stability is based on “unconscious instinct” would have interested Wilde and 
his readers at the time of writing. In his second Nineteenth-Century article “Justice 
Concluded”, published when Wilde was drafting “The True Function”, Spencer had charted 
the evolutionary progression of morality from an instinctive animal sympathy to a primitive 
tribal ethics and finally to industrial capitalism’s supposedly reflective human altruism.17 
Spencer argued that “the altruistic sentiment of justice” develops from a more primitive 
sentiment of justice in which:  
four kinds of fear co-operate. The dread of retaliation, the dread of social dislike, the 
dread of legal punishment, and the dread of divine vengeance, united in various 
proportions, form a body of feeling which checks the primitive tendency to pursue the 
objects of desire without regard to the interests of fellow-men. (“On Justice 
Concluded” 612) 
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In Spencer’s formulation, it was not just the “passion for sin”, but also these rudimentary 
ethical acts – the beginnings of justice towards others – that emerged from (to use Wilde’s 
phraseology) “fearful impulses”. Perhaps there is more than meets the eye to Lord Henry’s 
assertion in Dorian Gray that “Conscience and cowardice are really the same things” 
(Complete Works III: 173). Wilde, after all, cautioned in “The Soul of Man” that sympathy 
with the pain of others includes “a certain element of terror for our own safety” (317). A 
Spencerian understanding of primitive morality, with its foundations in fear or “dread”, may 
shape Gilbert’s understanding of “vulgar” ethics: “To be good, according to the vulgar 
standard of goodness, is obviously quite easy. It merely requires a certain amount of sordid 
terror, a certain lack of imaginative thought, and a certain low passion for middle-class 
respectability”. And it also helps to contextualise the striking statement that follows Gilbert’s 
assertion:   
Aesthetics are higher than ethics. Even a colour-sense is more important in the 
development of the individual than a sense of right and wrong. Aesthetics, in fact, are 
to Ethics, in the sphere of human civilisation, what, in the sphere of the external 
world, Sexual is to Natural Selection. Ethics, like Natural Selection, make existence 
possible. Aesthetics, like Sexual Selection, make life lovely and wonderful, fill it with 
new forms, give it progress, and variety, and change.  (“True Function” 458)18  
Although Wilde clearly employs Darwinian terminology, this passage begs a number of 
questions. How consistent is Wilde’s science here, and how, exactly, are we to read these 
metaphors?  In a Darwinian schema, aesthetics are not just like sexual selection, but are 
fundamental to the process, many female animals displaying sophisticated powers of 
“discrimination and taste” in the selection of males (Descent 246). Wilde’s use of 
terminology, however – aesthetic capability as a “higher” faculty, which makes life “lovely 
and wonderful” – suggests a human attribute at once more advanced and less functional in 
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evolutionary terms than morality, or at least a Spencerian notion of primitive morality that 
relies on “sordid terror” to maintain social life.  
 To claim “Ethics, like natural selection, make existence possible” may also allude to 
writers who saw them as more than merely analogous – in particular, to scientists who saw 
natural selection as the evolutionary mechanism that shaped ethical attributes. For Darwin, 
“social instincts” (including sympathy) that had evolved through natural selection were “the 
prime principle of man’s moral constitution” (Descent 151). Spencer, while agreeing on the 
centrality of sympathy, had offered a more strongly Lamarckian account of the evolution of 
feeling, suggesting that it was possible to inherit “modifications produced by habit”. This 
mechanism – sometimes known as “use inheritance” – was seen by many nineteenth-century 
evolutionists to be as plausible as natural selection. In this formulation, social structures, 
evolving organically over generations, could come to shape instinct and feeling in 
descendents: “there are further being produced in man,” Spencer argued, “sentiments 
appropriate to social life” (“Justice Concluded” 609).  
 Wilde at times seems to endorse both natural selection and inheritance of 
“modifications produced by habit”, making his conception of the interplay between biology 
and culture tricky to pin down.19  He did not, however, share one of Spencer’s key assertions 
regarding the evolution of feeling: that ongoing moral progress had already been 
demonstrated by the gradual widening of sympathetic impulses. Wilde’s politics in the early 
1890s were very different from Spencer’s: Wilde disputed that capitalism was a healthy 
social structure that fostered “sentiments” conducive to progress. Indeed, Wilde’s distrust of 
sympathy and altruism in “The True Function” and “The Soul of Man” might be seen as a 
refutation of a Spencerian position that naturalised capitalism, and claimed it as morally 
progressive stage of social life. 
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While some kind of “moral sense” with a biological origin seems to have been 
assumed by Wilde, the notion that it could be relied upon alone for ethical decision-making 
was openly mocked in his writings. In his critical essays, a morality based on feeling alone is 
often depicted as deeply suspect. While Gilbert in “The True Function” notes that the free 
market capitalism of the Manchester School appealed to “the lowest instincts”, a sentimental 
“emotional sympathy” is deemed equally dangerous: it is “too variable, too closely connected 
with the passions” (457). “The real weakness of England […] lies simply in the fact that her 
national ideals are emotional and not intellectual”, he proclaims (446). His assertion that “it is 
so easy for people to have sympathy with suffering. It is so difficult for them to have 
sympathy with thought” (446), is repeated in Wilde’s own critical voice in “The Soul of 
Man” (292). 
 The striking statement in “A Preface to Dorian Gray”, that “No artist has ethical 
sympathies” (Fortnightly Review 480) needs to be read, I would argue, not only in the context 
of the art for art’s sake movement, but in light of Wilde’s suspicion of sympathy as an 
inherently ethical force.20 Rather than endorsing Huxley’s notion of “moral sympathies” or 
Spencer’s theorisation of the evolution of altruism, in both “The True Function” and “The 
Soul of Man”, Wilde argued that the conceptions of sympathy and altruism that had emerged 
under capitalism had served to maintain an exploitative the status quo.21 When Lord Henry 
announces in Dorian Gray that “The nineteenth century has gone bankrupt through an over-
expenditure of sympathy”, this statement functions as more than simple provocation (203).22 
 
Art, Tribal Ethics and Sympathetic Individualism  
While Gilbert in the “True Function” is sure that “in the eyes of the thinker, the real 
harm that emotional sympathy does is that it limits knowledge, and so prevents us from 
solving any single social problem” (444), in “The Soul of Man” Wilde asserted: “The proper 
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aim is to try and reconstruct society on such a basis that poverty will be impossible. And the 
altruistic virtues have really prevented the carrying out of this aim” (292; italics in original).23 
Countering Spencer’s understanding of sympathy as an inherently moral attribute, he 
announced:  
Sympathy with pain there will, of course, always be.  It is one of the first instincts of 
man.  The animals which are individual, the higher animals, that is to say, share it 
with us.  But it must be remembered that while sympathy with joy intensifies the sum 
of joy in the world, sympathy with pain does not really diminish the amount of pain.  
It may make man better able to endure evil, but the evil remains. (317) 
 This is a typically Wildean (and possibly wilful) misreading of Darwin: in the Descent it is 
the gregarious and cooperative animals that are capable of experiencing sympathy and 
complex social emotions, rather than “animals which are individual” (Descent 100-27). Yet 
Wilde’s wider point is to question whether the feeling of sympathy under capitalism can be 
an intrinsically moral force: and indeed to question an altruism that substitutes individual 
self-sacrifice for structural change. Rather than Spencer’s understanding of altruistic justice 
as the product of the most advanced social structure, for Wilde it is a primitive impulse, 
“merely a survival of savage mutilation” (“The Soul of Man” 315). To live for others (to use 
the definition of altruism coined by Auguste Comte), is to live for the maintenance of a still 
rudimentary social state. “It takes a thoroughly selfish age, like our own, to deify self-
sacrifice”, asserts Gilbert. “It takes a thoroughly grasping age, such as that in which we live, 
to set above the intellectual virtues those virtues that are of immediate practical benefit to 
itself” (“The True Function” 445).  
The notion of capitalism as productive of unhealthy emotion “of immediate practical 
benefit to itself” was outlined clearly in “The Soul of Man”:  
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Jealousy, which is an extraordinary source of crime in modern life, is an emotion 
closely bound up with our conceptions of property, and under Socialism and 
Individualism will die out. It is remarkable that in communistic tribes jealousy is 
entirely unknown. (302)  
The Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin, openly admired by Wilde, was also a regular 
presence in the Nineteenth Century while “The Soul of Man” was in gestation; indeed one of 
Kropotkin’s articles, “Mutual Aid Among Animals”, was published in the same monthly 
issue as the second part of Wilde’s “The True Function”.24 Significantly, Kropotkin’s series 
on mutual aid was initially conceived as a rebuttal of articles by Huxley in the Nineteenth 
Century: Kropotkin sought to counter Huxley’s assumptions concerning nature’s “gladiators’ 
show” in “The Struggle for Existence”, as well as his endorsement of private property in “On 
the Natural Inequality of Men” (Jan. 1890) and “Natural and Political Rights” (Feb. 1890).  
In “Natural Inequality”, Huxley had maintained that the patriarchal family was the 
earliest form of society, and that “almost all parts of the world, and almost all nations, have 
yielded evidence that, in the earliest settled condition we can get at, land was held as private 
or several property, and not as the property of the public, or general body of the nation” (17). 
Kropotkin contested this developmental narrative: tribes practising communal ownership, not 
families, were the first social units, he asserted in “Mutual Aid Among Savages” (Apr. 1890). 
“Far from being a primitive form of organization”, he announced, “the family is a very late 
product of human evolution” (540). Kropotkin’s attempts to counter Huxley’s assertions – 
which included mounting the case for the “primitive communism” of tribal societies – echo 
Wilde’s own comments on the “communistic tribes” in which “jealousy is entirely 
unknown”. Kropotkin drew on Darwinian theorisations of cooperative instincts and 
anthropological accounts of tribal morality to justify a political evolutionary narrative that 
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was very different from Huxley’s, predicting an inevitable progression towards a 
communitarian permutation of anarchism.  
Moreover, Kropotkin was not the only writer in the Nineteenth Century to use 
evolutionary theory to question Huxley and Spencer’s naturalisation of capitalism. In “A 
Working Man’s Reply to Professor Huxley”, J. D. Christie, who described himself as a pastry 
cook, used a Spencerian vocabulary to overturn Spencerian and Huxleyian conclusions about 
the dangers of socialism. The misery of social inequality, Christie argued, must be dealt with, 
for “its existence demonstrates some maladjustment in the social organism” (477). The 
permanence of capitalism was to be challenged on the same evolutionary principle that led 
Spencer to question the permanence of human nature. While Spencer had pointed to the error 
of those who “will not accept the adjustability of human nature to social life” (“Justice 
Concluded” 609), Christie had also argued for human adjustability – but an adjustment that 
would be linked to socialism as the most progressive form of social development.   
While socialist and anarchist theorisations of evolutionary morality published in the 
Nineteenth Century play a notable role in shaping Wilde’s critique of altruism in “The Soul 
of Man”, Darwinian-inflected understandings of tribal morality were also part of Wilde’s 
formative reading, as his extensive paraphrases from W. K. Clifford in his Oxford 
commonplace book attest.  Wilde owned Clifford’s Lectures and Essays, and was particularly 
interested in Clifford’s “On the Scientific Basis of Morals”, first published in the 
Contemporary Review under James Knowles (1875). Clifford’s article was inspired by 
Darwin’s reflections on the significance of co-operative instincts in ensuring group survival 
in the Descent of Man. Under the heading of “Moral Chemistry” in his commonplace book, 
Wilde paraphrased Clifford: “the force of categorical imperative of the modern moral sense 
rests on the fact that natural selection has left to survive only those tribes in whom a tribal 
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sense is strong and also by the strong punishments inflicted on any violation of tribal rules” 
(Oxford Notebooks 130).  
While Smith and Helfand have claimed that Wilde believed “humane qualities did not 
evolve through natural selection” (Oxford Notebooks 84), this assertion may need to be 
revised in light of both Wilde’s early engagement with Clifford and his subsequent 
participation in Nineteenth Century debates. Indeed, Wilde’s departure from an idealist 
position on the subject of the evolution of the human faculties – including the “humane 
qualities” - is brought into sharper relief when his assertions in “The True Function” are 
compared with other articles published in the Nineteenth Century, such as H. Carlisle’s 
“Wallace on Darwinism”, which appeared in the periodical four months before the first part 
of Wilde’s “The True Function” was published.  
Reviewing Alfred Russell Wallace’s widely discussed book Darwinism, Carlisle 
echoed Wallace’s own criticism of “the application of the principle of natural selection to the 
evolution of the human faculties” (412). Carlisle cited Wallace’s claim that Darwin’s “whole 
argument tends to the conclusion that man’s entire nature and all his faculties, whether moral, 
intellectual, or spiritual, have been derived from their rudiments in the lower animals, in the 
same manner and by the action of the same laws as his physical structure has been derived”, 
materialist claims that both Wallace and Carlisle both sought to refute (412).25 Gilbert’s 
assertion that there is no form of human emotion that is not shared with the lower animals 
takes on new significance in the light of these controversies. Readers who turned to 
Kropotkin’s “Mutual Aid among Animals” after finishing the concluding part of Wilde’s 
“The True Function” would have found a continuation of this debate about the evolution of 
morality. Kropotkin maintained that “very often self-sacrifice for the common welfare” was 
the rule in animal as well as human communities (334); Darwinian natural selection for 
cooperative qualities did indeed, he argued, explain “moral development” (337).  
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Wilde’s “Soul of Man” offers a similarly politicised reading of the evolution of 
cooperation: both Kropotkin and Wilde use the ethics of “communistic tribes” to refute the 
naturalisation of capitalist individualism. Wilde’s commonplace book, however, reveals that, 
in his earlier engagement with Clifford, a nascent interest in the relationship between ethics 
and private property is already apparent. Noting that the “basis of our moral Feelings may be 
found in the desire for self-preservation”, Wilde was careful to clarify that: 
This preservation of self is not the individual self but what Clifford calls the “Tribal 
Self”: individualism, private property, and a private conscience […] do not appear till 
late in all civilizations: it is the Tribal self wh. is the first mainspring of action, and 
canon of right and wrong: a savage is not only hurt when a man treads on his own 
foot, but when the foot of the tribe is trodden on. (Oxford Notebooks 129-30) 26        
Private property, Wilde suggests, is not foundational to early society, nor is it fundamental to 
human nature – a claim that is not directly discussed in Clifford’s essay, but which set Wilde 
at odds with both Huxley and Spencer. In “[The Rise] of Historical Criticism”, Wilde had 
made clear that he believed the family – linked explicitly by Henry Maine, and later, Huxley, 
to the first societies and to property acquisition – was instead a late arrival in civilisation 
(Complete Works IV: 22-26). “Neither in its matured development, or in its earliest starting 
point of evolution, is the canon of ethics the greatest happiness of the greatest number but the 
preservation of the Tribe, its highest excellence”, Wilde had paraphrased from Clifford’s 
essay in his commonplace book, emphasising the significance of the tribal self to future 
social development.  He went on to add, significantly, “nor is goodness merely altruism, or 
service to others because they are others, but service done to a community by an individual 
who is part of that community”, drawing on Clifford’s own distinction between piety and 
altruism (Oxford Notebooks 130).27   
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 If the periodicals in which Wilde published were known for their fearless 
explorations of evolution and ethics – for their willingness to consider biological and secular 
as well as religious explanations for morality - Wilde’s own early interest in this subject was 
also shaped by his engagement with the writings of those agnostics in James Knowles’s 
periodical circles. The trenchant attack on religion in Clifford’s 1877 Contemporary Review 
article “The Ethics of Belief” was partly responsible for the existence of the Nineteenth 
Century – it was the catalyst for the removal of Knowles as editor of the Contemporary, and 
for his foundation of the new periodical. Along with Huxley, Clifford was a contributor to the 
Nineteenth Century’s 1877 “Modern ‘Symposium’” debate “The Influence upon Morality of 
a Decline in Religious Belief”, where he had also suggested that “the spring of virtuous 
action is the social instinct”, claiming the conscience was an inherited race instinct, the 
product of a “wider self” (956-57).    
It is notable that debates over property in the Nineteenth Century in the early 1890s 
were often linked to wider disputes about the evolution of moral impulses – including those 
provoked by Spencer’s “On Justice” and Huxley’s “On the Natural Inequality of Men”. 
Spencer asserted in “On Justice” that the love of property was instinctive in both animals and 
humans, and was a feeling that decisively shaped the growth of both early and modern social 
structures. In “The Soul of Man”, Wilde disputed that property was a source of instinctive 
pleasure.   
Private property has crushed true Individualism, and set up an Individualism that is 
false.   It has debarred one part of the community from being individual by starving 
them.  It has debarred the other part of the community from being individual by 
putting them on the wrong road, and encumbering them. […] One’s regret is that 
society should be constructed on such a basis that man has been forced into a groove 
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in which he cannot freely develop what is wonderful, and fascinating, and delightful 
in him – in which, in fact, he misses the true pleasure and joy of living. (296-97) 
The question of how society can be both a “construct” and an evolutionary state is never 
answered in “The Soul of Man” – surely a problem for the essay’s coherence. However, 
Wilde’s commitment to a model of progressive organic social evolution (albeit one which 
fails to explain how capitalism as a digression down the “wrong road” emerges) may also 
help to explain the need to redefine individual freedom in the essay. What is clear is that in 
Wilde’s schema, aesthetic pleasure – possible only for the unfettered individual whose gifts 
are allowed to develop without social impediment – is the true symbol of the “joy of living”. 
Wilde’s conception of an individualism that can be reached only through socialism overturns 
Spencer and Huxley’s understanding of both concepts.28 Yet Wilde explicitly draws on 
Spencerian phraseology – arguing that Socialism will “restore society to its proper condition 
of a thoroughly healthy organism” – to refute Spencer’s political conclusions.29  
Given Wilde uses “The Soul of Man” to challenge assumptions about “morbid” art 
and to champion artistic individualism, his simultaneous endorsement of the link between art 
and social health is striking. In the socialist future, a new understanding of individualism will 
lead to a reconfigured sympathy: it will “be large, healthy, and spontaneous”. Sympathy with 
pain is “tainted with egotism” and “apt to become morbid”.30 Under socialism individuals 
will sympathise with “life’s joy and beauty and energy and health and freedom” (“The Soul 
of Man” 317). “The evolution of man is slow”, claimed Wilde in this article (318), but it was 
assumed nevertheless, as a progression that would allow society to develop beyond 
capitalism and its “unhealthy” altruism. And while Wilde sought to wrest sympathy from its 
Spencerian definition, once a “true” definition had been substituted, the relationship between 
its gradual widening and social progress could be restored. Wilde’s decadent aesthetic, here 
at least, is combined with a distinct endorsement of social meliorism. This is why art in “The 
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Soul of Man” can take such a paradoxical role, standing simultaneously as a symbol of 
individualism and of the moral state of the nation. 
Appreciation of Wilde’s engagement with wider periodical literature might provide 
deeper insights into his evolutionary meliorism – and indeed his tendencies towards political 
materialism. Echoing William Morris in News from Nowhere, Wilde asserted in “The Soul of 
Man” that “the conditions will be done away with, and human nature will change. […] The 
systems that fail are those that rely on the permanency of human nature, and not on its growth 
and development” (315).31 In the early 1890s, Morris, whose work Wilde claimed “he would 
always love” (Letters 290-91), also endorsed a politicised form of ethical evolution that 
predicted a partial return to tribal morality. The possible influence of not just Morris, but 
wider Commonweal contributors on “The Soul of Man”’s endorsement of moral evolution 
should not be overlooked.32  
Bruce Haley has argued that “Wilde himself […] regarded his personal and literary 
styles as models of growth, not degeneracy”, a position, he claims, that “he formulated before 
he was well known” and that owed more to Spencer and Comte than to Pater (215-16). While 
a model of growth is certainly implied in “The Soul of Man”, Wilde’s position was still 
evolving in the 1890s, emerging as part of a dialogue on morality, aesthetics and socialism 
that animated the periodicals in which he was writing. In that dialogue, Wilde sought to 
challenge Spencer and Huxley’s endorsement of capitalism, even as he adopted their organic 
analogies. 
Pursuing this relationship might offer a more nuanced perspective on Wilde’s 
attempts to separate art and morality, revealing this manoeuvre to be more than a decadent 
rejection of didactic art. Wilde, indebted to Huxley’s understanding of a directionless nature, 
also parted company from him in significant ways, including in his suspicion of the moral 
role that Huxley accorded to feeling. Wilde’s scepticism about art’s appeal to our sympathies 
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needs to be re-read in the context of writings by contemporaries such as Spencer and Huxley, 
who saw aesthetic and moral faculties as closely intertwined. Well-read in the scientific 
debates of his day, Wilde came to his own conclusions about sympathy and its dangers. 
Paradox and wilful contradiction aside, Wilde asserted at least one consistent moral position: 
while a beauty sense and a moral sense were both conceived as part of our evolutionary 
heritage, emotion alone should form the foundation of neither ethics nor art.  
 Smith and Helfand view Wilde’s Oxford notebooks as the intellectual key to his later 
articles: Wilde is seen as displaying a “carefully reasoned philosophical and political stance”, 
a synthesis of idealist and Spencerian evolutionary theory that is convincingly adopted from 
the late 1870s onwards (Oxford Notebooks vii). In contrast, Guy’s Wilde is a very different 
creature, a journalist whose periodical writings are far from intellectually coherent: they are, 
she argues, self-consciously topical and provocative pieces that reveal philosophical and 
political contradictions (Guy, ‘“Soul of Man’”). This article has made the case that, while the 
Oxford Notebooks establish Wilde’s long-standing engagements with evolutionary debates, 
the periodical contexts of the 1890s play an important role in shaping his literary use of this 
theory. In the pages of the Nineteenth Century and Fortnightly Review, Wilde’s literary 
dialogues were intentionally open-ended, creating their meanings as part of a wider 
journalistic conversation. Wilde’s provocative style spoke to readers used to pondering the 
big questions: not only the place of aesthetics and ethics, but the nature of their own 
evolution as moral and art-loving animals. 
 
NOTES 
                                                 
1 “The True Function” was revised for Intentions as “The Critic as Artist”, the title by which it is now 
better known. 
2 See Guy, “The Soul of Man” in Wilde Writings 59-85 and introduction to Wilde, Complete Works 
IV: lxxvi-lxxi. 
3 The Fortnightly Review and Nineteenth Century in the 1890s used a number of the same 
contributors (Huxley and Peter Kropotkin amongst them). The Metaphysical Society (1869-80), 
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presided over by the Nineteenth Century’s editor James Knowles, included agnostics and atheist 
thinkers with clear interests in science and ethics who became important contributors to the periodical 
(including W. K. Clifford and Leslie Stephen). On the editorial policies of the Nineteenth Century and 
the Fortnightly, see Small.  
4 Guy argues that Wilde’s reference to “the Church” in the opening of the periodical version of “The 
Soul of Man” is “almost certainly an allusion to Cardinal Manning, one of the authors of a series of 
articles on philanthropy entitled ‘Irresponsible Wealth’ which appeared in the Nineteenth Century in 
Dec. 1890,” two months before the publication of Wilde’s article’ (in Wilde, Complete Works IV: 
lxxvi-lxxi). Guy also notes Wilde’s praise of the Nineteenth Century, despite disagreeing with 
Knowles’s editorial decision to split “The True Function” into two articles.  
5 Wilde claimed that “The Decay of Lying” was sketched out at a dinner with Robert Ross, a meeting 
Guy has suggested is unlikely to have taken place before late November or early December 1888; this 
timing means Huxley’s “Struggle” could easily be a direct influence. It should be noted, however, that 
the influence was not mutual: Huxley was no appreciator of Wilde in person or enthusiast for 
aestheticism in literature (see Dawson 190-221).   
6 Levine has also argued for art’s consolatory power for Wilde in a post-Darwinian context in “The 
Decay of Lying”; while I broadly agree with this analysis I argue that it is Huxley, rather than Darwin, 
who is the most obvious direct influence on Wilde’s formulation of aesthetics.    
7 On Wilde’s library, which also included Spencer’s First Principles, see Wainwright 496. 
8 On Müller’s influence see Smith and Helfand, Oxford Notebooks 204.   
9 On this aspect of Spencer’s influence on Wilde see Haley and Smith and Helfand, Oxford 
Notebooks 29.   
10 Darwin placed a much stronger emphasis on natural selection as the mechanism that developed 
these traits than Spencer, although he also drew attention to the role of reason, habit and culture. 
Spencer’s articles “On Justice” would later form part of his Principles of Ethics (1892-93).   
11 This edition was first issued in parts from 1872-3. The material on altruism and aesthetics was 
absent from the first edition (1855).  
12 See also Spencer’s article on “The Origin and Function of Music” (first published in Fraser’s 
Magazine in 1857), in which he discusses music as a language of feeling which promotes sympathetic 
communication, and predicts a future in which “feelings of higher and more cultivated kinds, as yet 
experienced only by the cultivated few, will become general” (Literary Style and Music 75).   
13 Cohen has rightly drawn attention to the similarity of Wilde’s phraseology to Pater’s essay on 
Wordsworth, where “sterility” is also assumed in the contemplation of art (110-11). While I do not 
dispute this influence, Pater’s claim that “the end of life is not action but contemplation” is also 
different from Wilde’s separation of the role of emotion in life and art in this passage.   
14 In his book Hume, Huxley approvingly cited Hume’s claim that for virtue to be “desirable on its 
own account […] merely for the immediate satisfaction which it conveys, it is requisite that there 
should be some sentiment which it touches; some internal taste or feeling […] which distinguishes 
moral good and evil, and which embraces one and rejects the other” (206-7).  
15 For an interesting discussion of heredity in Wilde that also touches on Huysman, see Foster, 
“Against Nature? Science and Oscar Wilde” in Between Shadows 38-43. Wainwright also focuses on 
heredity in Dorian Gray, with a particular focus on August Weissmann; I, however, would dispute his 
claim that Wilde “enjoyed the comfort of religion reconciled to the natural mechanism of evolution” 
(510).   
16 As Smith and Helfand suggest, this claim echoes Spencer’s Data of Ethics (Oxford Notebooks 205). 
17 Spencer noted in The Principles of Psychology, “I gladly adopt this word, for which we are 
indebted to M. Comte” (673). 
18 Critics have struggled to make sense of this Darwinian analogy. Smith and Helfand have interpreted 
it as evidence that Wilde formulated a “nonauthoritiarian socialist theory” that encouraged “reduced 
competition (and thus natural selection) as the way of achieving continuous cultural and social 
improvement” (Oxford Notebooks 206). Given natural and sexual selection are both competitive 
mechanisms, however, this reading seems hard to justify.  
19 See, for instance, the considerable ambiguity in Wilde’s phraseology when he discusses Plato’s 
recommendations for the development of aesthetic temperament in “The True Function”: “By slow 
 28 
                                                                                                                                                        
degrees there is to be engendered in [the young Greek] such a temperament as will lead him naturally 
and simply to choose the good in preference to the bad, and rejecting what is vulgar and discordant, to 
follow by fine instinctive taste all that possesses grace and charm and loveliness”. Temperament is 
both “engendered” and becomes instinctive, suggesting a Lamarckian notion of the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics (450).   
20 Wilde made this claim eight months earlier in a letter “To the Editor of the Scots Observer”; see 
Bristow in Wilde Complete Works III: lvii.  
21 For a more detailed account of Darwinian, Huxleyan and Spencerian formulations of sympathy, see 
Sumpter, “On Suffering”.   
22 Lord Henry’s reflections on sympathy appear only in the 1891 version of Dorian Gray, and are 
closely linked to Wilde’s subsequent assertions in “The Soul of Man”.     
23 As Dixon notes, Wilde also rejects the designation of Christ as altruist in De Profundis (Invention 
of Altruism 340-43). For suggestive studies of the pervasiveness of altruism as a concept in this 
period, see Collini (60-90) and Dixon.     
24 On Wilde’s references to Kropotkin see Wilde Complete Works II: 184-85. 
25 Wallace did acknowledge that this was not a direct statement from Darwin; in fact, the Descent is 
much more balanced in its discussion of culture and habit as well as biological instinct as forces that 
shape morality.  
26 Clifford claimed, “We must carefully distinguish the tribal self from society, or from ‘the common 
consciousness’; it is something in the mind of each individual man which binds together his 
gregarious instincts.” However, the tribal self is not associated specifically with primitivism: “The 
word tribe is here used to mean a group of that size which in the circumstances considered is selected 
for survival or destruction as a group” (Lectures and Essays 112; italics in original).   
27 Clifford preceded the claims about community paraphrased by Wilde with the assertion “Piety is 
not Altruism”, using the former to refer to the communal ethic of the tribal self. Clifford’s formulation 
that the individual “loses in that service the consciousness that he is anything different from the 
community” is stronger than Wilde’s (Clifford Lectures and Essays 122).     
28 For a broader contextualisation of debates over individualism that may have shaped “The Soul of 
Man”, including the role of Spencer, see Guy ‘“Soul of Man”’ 72-78, and Thomas.  
29 This terminology is also found in Clifford’s “On the Scientific Basis of Morals”, where he suggests 
that “the social organism, like the individual, may be healthy or diseased”. He adds: “certain social 
diseases consist in a wrong direction of the conscience” (Lectures and Essays 122).  
30 This is a close paraphrase of Lord Henry’s pronouncement in Dorian Gray (Complete Works III: 
203).  
31 Lamarckian tendencies in both Wilde and Morris’s thought may help to explain how sympathy can 
be perceived as both instinctive and an instinct seemingly perverted by capitalism. Although Wilde 
refers to “My friends the Fabianists” in “The Soul of Man”, the notion that true socialism involves the 
disbanding of the state has more in common with Morris than with Fabian socialism.  
32 On the many articles on tribal morality published in the Commonweal (including direct responses to 
Huxley’s Nineteenth Century articles), see Sumpter, “Anthropology”. Thomas has argued that News 
from Nowhere’s serialisation in the Commonweal between January and October 1890 means it “was 
almost certain to have been ready to the hand and thought of Oscar Wilde while he was preparing 
‘The Soul of Man Under Socialism’” (86). If, as Guy has asserted, “The Soul of Man” was 
substantially written in late autumn and early winter of 1890, this direct influence seems plausible 
(Wilde Complete Works IV: ixx). Both Kropotkin and Morris believed that the aggression towards 
outsiders that characterized tribal society would be lessened in a politically progressive society that 
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